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"What about the people who were at the battlefront during
the liberation of our country, and who are not educated?
What are we going to do? Many of us are illiterate people
who only know how to fight. Now we are being threatened by
intellectuals who were lucky to be sent abroad by SWAPO to
study for the benefit of the Namibian nation."1
In early 1995, Boutros Boutros Ghali released an amended version
of his now famous Agenda for Peace. According to the Secretary
General, the composition elements of the United Nations' peace
support programme consisted of preventive diplomacy, peace
making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building.2
More than any other single element in Boutros Ghali's typology,
the military stands at the crossroads of all points on this peace
continuum: it is the trigger of conflict, it is primary
instrument of violence, it is the enforcement arm of
international law and it is the ultimate symbol of
reconciliation. From technical issues of disarmament and
demining to the human dimension of reconciliation and
reintegration into society, the question of the military ranks
as the most complex and volatile components of any peace support
operation. Devising an approach which takes into account both
the multi-faceted nature of demilitarization and its varied time
frame is one of the pressing challenges for the international
community in the wake of the onset of peace.
This article will analyse the United Nations' experience of
demilitarization in Southern Africa with reference to the issues
surrounding the transition from an emergency situation to a
developmental context. The three UN peace support operations in
Southern Africa, namely Namibia, Mozambique and Angola, will be
examined to assess the international organisation's role in that
process. In so doing, the article highlights a number of themes,
including the importance of developing a regional approach to
demilitarization; the imperative of cooperation both within the
UN itself and with the international donor and NGO community as
a whole; and the need to develop a greater understanding of the
efficacy of "targeting" demilitarization programmes towards ex-
combatants in light of the broader goals of demilitarization.
I. Between Emergency and Development: Theoretical Parameters of
Demilitarisation and Peace Building
Demilitarisation of combatants, a process which encompasses the
demobilisation and disarmament of troops and their reintegration
into society,3 holds as its premise that combatants are
particularly dangerous elements to interject into the fluid post-
conflict situation. Both the perpetrators and, as often, the
objects of brutalizing violence, combatants have the capacity to
disrupt the fragile peace settlement, either by returning to open
hostilities with their opponents or resorting to armed banditry
in the aftermath of formal peace. Accordingly, it has become a
kind of cardinal principle that these self-same volatile elements
and circumstances can be offset through a targeted programme
which builds on the structured demobilization and disarmament of
combatants in conjunction with some form of monetary and
educational incentives designed to facilitate their peaceful
reintroduction to civilian life:. This two phased approach to the
question of demilitarization of combatants is composed of both
the short term objectives of emergency assistance and the long
term objectives of development. As such, it is well-ensconced
within the emergency/development continuium as it is currently
manifested in peacekeeping operations and subject to all of the
complexities inherent in that process.
The demilitarization programmes instituted by the UN have, in the
main, recognized the necessity of extending the scope of
demilitarization beyond the short term objectives of
demobilization and disarmament. In the lexicon of the UN, peace
building represents the transitional point between the
demobilisation of combatants and their full reintegration into
society.
Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be
truly successful, must come to include
comprehensive efforts to identify and support
structures which will tend to consolidate
peace...(T)he concept of peace-building as the
construction of a new environment should be
viewed as a counterpart of preventive
diplomacy...4
Nevertheless, further conceptual clarity on the matter of
emergency concerns and development imperatives, and their
relationship to the objectives of demilitarisation, is needed if
UN peace support operations are to act effectively in this area.
In this same vein, it is therefore noted that the controversies
which often attend project design and implementation in
demilitarization are themselves a product of this disjuncture
between the emergency and development ethos.5 Indeed, it is the
contention of one SRSG that this disjuncture is one of the major
failings of UN Peace Support Operations.6 More than a mere
intellectual oversight, to be recognized and corrected, the gap
between emergency and development ethos is rooted in and finds
institutional expression in the differing UN agencies which make
up peace support operations. Another element which further
complicates the situation is the role of the international NGO
community which itself is divided along the emergency and
development fault line and, accordingly, acts with varying
degrees of autonomy from the UN peace support operation. This
has the Janus effect of, at times, contradicting the aims of the
mission and, in other instances, ameliorating the oversights or
failings of the UN.
II. The UN, Demilitarization and the Southern African Context
In the aftermath of colonialism and apartheid, intensified by the
struggle to dislodge these elements through force of arms,
Southern Africa is a landscape awash with the brutal legacies
conflict. Super power intervention further contributed to the
immolation of the physical, social and indeed, spiritual terrain
of the region. And while the conflicts in Namibia, Angola and
Mozambique were often disaggregated into discrete confrontations,
the common denominator of apartheid South Africa, a regional
hegemon anxious to reshape Southern Africa in its own image, and
an extensive ideologically-based external intervention, belies
cognitive approaches (and the attendant policy implications)
which are predicated on the inviolability of the state system.
Demilitarisation, as it has become abundantly clear in the wake
of UN involvement in Southern Africa, is not a national problem
but rather a regional one.
The three cases from Southern Africa -- Namibia, Angola and
Mozambique -- provide concrete examples of UN involvement in
demilitarization, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of
its changing approach in the region. Most notably, the UN
refined its demilitarisation programme to include both short and
long term components as well as moving towards an integrated and
comprehensive approach to the issue of the military. In each
case study, the following areas will be examined: the
demilitarization programme as conceived in the peace settlement;
the demilitarization programme as organised by the UN peace
support operation; and the record of implementation.
Namibia and UNTAG
Established in the wake of the signing of the New York Accords
in December 1988, Namibia was the first post-Cold War mission of
the UN, the largest peacekeeping operation since the ill-fated
mission to the Congo and the most complex ever undertaken by the
organisation. As such it posed a series of challenges to the
UN's capacity to conduct a multi-dimensional operation that
incorporated elements of traditional peacekeeping as well as
novel components in such areas as police and elections
monitoring. Its successful resolution, despite some serious
incidents, gave considerable encouragement to the international
community as to the efficacy of extending the UN role in
peacekeeping world-wide.
A. The Peace Agreement and Demilitarization
The agreement formally ending the conflict in Namibian had in
fact been drawn up in 1978 under the auspices of the UN's Western
Contact Group. Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), which
called for the withdrawal of South African military and
administrative control over the territory and democratic
elections, formed the basis for the cessation of hostilities and
the transition to independence. Following the assent of all
parties to the New York Accords, the Security Council passed
resolution 629 (1989) which officially established the mission
to Namibia. Accordingly, the UN was charged with the supervision
of the cease fire, monitoring of the conduct of the South West
African Police (SWAPOL) police and observing the election
campaign. The time table for the operation was to cover twelve
months and contained the following steps:
* a cease fire was to be formally established on
1 April;
* the disbanding of the SWATF and SWAPO and the
reduction of SADF, from a high of 32,000 to nil
by 8 November 1989;
* elections were to be held 16 November 1989.
All of this was to take place in tandem with the Cuban withdrawal
from Angola, overseen by UNAVEM I (see below).
Overseeing the implementation of the entire process would be a
Special Representative of the Secretary General and a South
African appointed Administrator-General. To fulfil the stated
aims of SC Resolution 435, UNTAG would be structured to include
a civilian component, a police component and a military
component. The civilian component consisted of the Special
Representative's Office, which was supported by 42 smaller
political offices established across Namibia's ten regions, and
would provide overall direction and coordination to the mission,
as well as prepare the foundation for UNDP involvement after the
mission; an Independent Jurist who would arbitrate on matters
relevant to the peace process; the UNHCR, which was responsible
for the repatriation of refugees in advance of the elections; an
electoral division, which would oversee voter registration and
monitor the elections in November 1989; and a logistics division.
The police and military components are discussed below.
B. UNTAG and Demilitarization
In the Namibian case, the UN mission's involvement in
demilitarization was conceived wholly in terms of short term
objectives, that is to say, the demobilization and disarmament
of combatants. No provisions for reintegration of former
soldiers were introduced into the programme, nor were they the
recipients of any targeted projects, assistance or funding beyond
that provided in the course of their stay in the reception areas.
The first aspect of the United Nations Transitional Authority
Government's (UNTAG) role in demilitarization centred around the
supervision of the confinement and withdrawal of South African
troops from the territory and the concomitant repatriation of
South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) guerrillas from
their bases in southern Angola and Zambia. Linked to this was
the monitoring of the cease fire between the former foes. To
fulfil these objectives, UNTAG was to bring in a team of 200
military observers and 7,500 peacekeepers. Their task was to
monitor the following:
With
* the restriction of the South African Defence
Forces (SADF) to bases within Namibia by 1 April
1989 and their subsequent withdrawal from the
territory, with the first reduction to 12,000
troops by 14 May 1989, 1,500 troops by 1 July
1989 and total withdrawal by 8 November 1989;
* monitor the dismantling of the SWATF, commando
and ethnic units and their disarmament by 1 April
1989;
* monitor the disarmament and repatriation of
SWAPO forces, including the confinement of
selected forces to bases in Angola and Zambia7;
* policing of official entry points into the
country and reception areas for returnees.
The second aspect of UNTAG's role in demilitarization was the
monitoring of the Namibian police and those elements of the SADF
which had taken up civilian functions during the transition
period. Complicating the situation further was the incorporation
of the notorious counter-insurgency unit, Koevoet (Crowbar) into
SWAPOL. With SWAPOL given the principal role in maintaining law
and order during the transitional period, it would be the UN
mission's 360 CIVPOL members job to ensure that it did not engage
in acts of intimidation against the population during the run up
to the election. The use of CIVPOL in fulfilling this task was
one of UNTAG's innovations: no other mission had undertaken such
a direct and extensive policing role.
C. Implementation
The implementation of the demilitarization programme was subject
to the problems and constraints facing UNTAG. Despite having
literally years to prepare for the mission, when it came time to
implementing the objectives of SC Resolution 435 (1978), it was
clear that little work had been done to realize the actual
mechanics of the operation. In the first instance, delays in the
passage of enabling legislation by both the Security Council,
which only authorized the particulars of the operation on 16
February, and the General Assembly, which gave its approval two
weeks later, cut an already narrow margin for deployment of UNTAG
to the bare minimum. At the heart of these delays was a dispute
over the mission's budget, which pitted SWAPO and African states
anxious to see UNTAG maintain its full force strength in the
event of a return to hostilities and the Security Council
members, who believed that conditions had changed substantially
in the territory to warrant a reduction in size and cost of the
mission. Ultimately, the Security Council prevailed and UNTAG
peacekeeping troops were decreased to 4,650 (while officially
remaining at the original figure), reducing overall costs from
US$700mn to US$446mn.
With regard to the actual mission, some problems emerged due to
uncertainties as to UNTAG's chain of command. For instance,
while the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Martti
Ahtisaari, was nominally head of the mission, given the
specialized agencies institutional and financial independence
from New York, initially there were difficulties in coordination.
This was to impact upon the already problematic communication
between New York and the field headquarters, as well as adversely
effecting communication between the different components of the
mission in Namibia.8 Unwieldy procurement procedures, which
obliged UNTAG to forgo purchasing material from nearby South
Africa so as to maintain adherence to international sanctions,
and insufficient logistical arrangements in the field, was a
further obstacle.9 Nevertheless, the overall picture of the
mission was one of cooperation and successful coordination
between the different elements of the mission.
The first and most dangerous crisis came in the early days of the
UN mission with the unexpected infiltration of hundreds of SWAPO
guerrillas from their bases over the border. As the SADF had
been confined to bases, SWAPOL undertook to repel the incursion
alone. SWAPO contended that the intention of the incursion was
merely to move its forces into Namibia as part of the larger
demobilization exercise while the South African officials
declared it to be an outright violation of terms of the peace
agreement. Though UNTAG had already been alerted to possibility
of SWAPO incursions at least a month before it actually took
place, it was clear that neither New York nor the field office
in Windhoek had made provisions for this contingency.10 Faced
with a choice of unilateral action on the part of South Africa
and the implications of such action, UNTAG agreed to allow the
SADF to suspend its confinement and respond to the incursion by
releasing six battalions. Over 200 SWAPO members were killed
and, after a meeting of the Tripartite Commission11, Sam Nujoma
announced that SWAPO would return to its bases outside Lubango,
in Angola, under UNTAG escort. By 13 May, the cease fire was
back in place.
Another issue which clouded the demilitarization process was the
incorporation of Koevoet into the police force which had,
inexplicably, won UN approval in advance of the UNTAG mission.
With a deserved reputation for human rights abuses, there were
fears that intimidation of the electorate would be effectively
sanctioned in the guise of policing. Complaints by CIVPOL, whose
task it was to pair up with SWAPOL, as to both the conduct of
Koevoet and that of the police in general provoked a crisis.12
After much negotiation, Ahtisaari and Pienaar, the Administrator-
General, worked out a compromise which saw Koevoet members leave
the police and CIVPOL numbers increase substantially to 1,500.
The last former Koevoet members left the police at the end of
October 1989.u
Much of the formal disarmament and demobilization process was
effectively run outside of the UNTAG framework with the UN
playing the role of observer or monitor. In the case of SWAPO,
disarmament took place in Angola and Zambia followed by
registration of repatriated refugees, inclusive of former
guerrillas, at selected Assembly Areas over a seven day period.
As noted above, the SWATF disbanded in advance of the UNTAG
mission and, though its arms were stored on South African
military bases, the UN had difficulty gaining access to these
facilities to verify their contents.14
Despite continued reports of intimidation and covert South
African assistance to an anti-SWAPO coalition, the elections went
ahead on schedule. With nearly all of eligible Namibians voting,
SWAPO was elected to power with 57% support to rival DTA's 28.5%,
while the smaller parties picked up the rest of the votes.15 The
UNTAG mission, the UN's first significant post-Cold War peace
support operation, was viewed as a success.
Angola and UNAVEM II
In the case of Angola, the UN peace support operation was
reconstituted three times, in the first instance because its
mission was extended and later due to the failure of the previous
effort. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)
I, running from 1989 to 1991, was the complement to the UNTAG
mission in Namibia, monitoring the withdrawal of Cuban troops
from Angola. UNAVEM II, created in the wake of the successful
implementation of both UNAVEM I and UNTAG, was a more ambitious
mission that undertook both a monitoring and, in some instances,
facilitating role in what was to have been Angola's transition
from war to peace. UNAVEM II's failure, exacerbated by a host
of mitigating circumstances, cast a shadow over the UN's ability
to conduct multi-dimensional peace support operations.
A. The Peace Agreement and Demilitarization
The signing of the New York Accords in December 1988, which
included provisions for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola and South African forces from Namibia, was to see the
first direct UN involvement in Angola. Responding to a request
by the Angolan and Cuban governments, on 20 December 1988 the
Security Council passed SC Resolution 626 (1988) establishing a
United Nations mission to verify the withdrawal process in
Angola. In this capacity, the United Nations Angola Verification
Mission (UNAVEM I) oversaw the departure of 50,000 Cuban
soldiers, a process which was scheduled to take 30'months. In
order to complete its assignment, UNAVEM I was assigned a team
totalling 70 military observers under the command of Brigadier
General Pericles Ferreira Gomes, the Chief Military Observer.
The first contingent of military observers arrived on 10 January
1991 and they began taking up positions across the country.
Working from January 1989 to May 1991, the UN mission was able
to complete the pullout of Cuban troops ahead of the established
time table of July 1991.
Concurrently, peace talks were held under the auspices of the
Portuguese government with the introduction of representation
from the United States and the Soviet Union in the later stages
of discussion. With the failure of the Angolan government's 1991
offensive against the Unita stronghold in the southeastern corner
of the country underscored the inability of either party to
secure victory through force of arms. At the sixth round of the
talks in early, the Angolan parties finally agreed to a
comprehensive peace settlement which included a cease fire,
demobilization and the country's first democratic elections.
The Acordos de Paz para Angola, or Bicesse Accords, were signed
on 1 May 1991 in Portugal. They consisted of:
* a cease fire between the Government and Unita set to
take effect on 31 May 1991 and to be administered by
a Joint Commission staffed by both parties and
monitored by the UN;
* the demobilization of Government and Unita troops
and their integration into a unified national
military, to; be completed in advance of the elections;
* elections to be scheduled between September and
November 1992 and monitored by the international
community.
In a further agreement known as the "triple zero option", neither
side was permitted to purchase new armaments and the
international community (primarily in the form of the United
States and the Soviet Union) was charged with ensuring that no
transactions occurred.
In order to implement the peace agreement, the Bicesse Accords
established a series of commissions to administer the
introduction of its provisions. A Joint Political-Military
Commission (CCPM), staffed by senior representatives from the
Government and Unita, was created to manage the overall
implementation of peace agreement. The representatives from
Portugal, the United States, and Russia were given observer
status on the commission while the UN was confined to the
position of "invited guest". Linked to it was the Joint
Commission for the Verification and Control of the Cease-fire
(CMVF) , set up to oversee the: cease fire process. The Joint
Commission on the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA)
was the third institution created by the Bicesse Accord. In
addition, a number of working groups charged with overseeing
specific tasks, such as demobilization, de-mining, the police,
and humanitarian assistance, were established under the auspices
of the commissions.16
The success of the withdrawal process encouraged the two main
Angolan adversaries, the Government and Unita to request further
UN assistance in the fulfilment of their own bi-lateral peace
process. Though the UN had acted as an observer to the
negotiations at Bicesse, its role in the structuring of the peace
process had been severely circumscribed by one of the parties to
the final agreement. Unita had wanted a strong UN presence in
the country with substantial powers while the Angolan government,
anxious to uphold its sovereignty, sought to limit the UN role.17
The end result was that the position of the UN in the process
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would be, according to the plan, limited to monitoring and
verifying a range of aspects of demilitarization of the conflict.
These were:
* the end of hostile actions between the Government
and Unita, including propaganda by 15 May 1991;
* the cantonment of all military forces to designated
Assembly Areas by 1 August 1991;
* the demobilization of all military forces, including
the collection and disposal of weapons;
* the creation of a new national army;
* and, the neutrality of the national police force,
especially with regard to its fulfilment of provisions
for human rights.
B. UNAVEM and Demilitarization
The demilitarization programme in Angola was essentially short
term in emphasis, though there was some provisions made for long
term components. The short term programme focused on the
demobilisation and disarmament of combatants through a jointed
supervised process which included a limited UN role as monitors.
This heavily circumscribed role for the UN was one of the factors
which contributed to both the collapse of the demilitarization
programme and the popular perception of overall UNAVEM failure.
As for the long term components of demilitarisation, provisional
plans were made for targeted programmes that undertook training
of ex-combatants, but these were neither integrated into a broad-
based approach to reintegration nor (with the outbreak of
fighting) were they allowed to operate.
UNAVEM's involvement in Angola's programme for demilitarisation
centred on monitoring the cease fire, assuring the neutrality of
the national police force, observing the process of
demobilisation, and supporting the formation of a new national
army. Marshalling its limited human and financial resources to
this task, UNAVEM created teams of observers who were attached
to counterpart teams of Government and Unita representatives
established by the various commissions. Their role was to check
if the Angolans were carrying out their work in a fair and
unbiased fashion; there were no enforcement provisions as such
provided for in the Bicesse Accords and certainly none directly
available to UNAVEM. UNAVEM monitors were obliged to fan out
across the six main regions of the country -- Luanda, Huambo,
Lubango, Saurimo, Luena and Mavinga -- and take up positions in
one of the eighty-two locations there.18 From this vantage, UN
officials were to carry out their mission to monitor the
fulfilment of the peace agreement.
The verification of the cease fire was the responsibility of the
(CMVF). To fulfil this mandate, the CMVF sent teams to each of
the fifty Assembly Areas and the thirty-two "critical points".
While the Assembly Areas had, where possible, UNAVEM military
observers attached to them, the designated "critical points",
ports and other areas which could serve as conduits for lethal
material, were permanently staffed by UNAVEM observers. In
addition, UNAVEM developed a mobile reaction team to investigate
violations in either those areas which it had no permanent
presence or places outside of its established monitors.
Monitoring the conduct of the National Police was another
responsibility of the CMVF. The incapacity of UNAVEM to carry
out its mission was perhaps most vividly underscored in this
area. With only 89 monitors on hand, it was immediately obvious
that UNAVEM would not be in a position to fulfil its stated
duties. In a belated and. inadequate response to these
difficulties, the strength of the UN police observer contingent
was increased in May 1992 to 126 personnel.19
Demobilization was the responsibility of a working group formed
by the CCPM. The programme for demobilization called for the
cantonment of the Government's FAPLA and Unita's FALA forces at
50 designated Assembly Areas by 1 August 1992. Once in place,
the majority of the estimated 120,000 FAPLA troops and 65,000
FALA troops would be disarmed and brought into civilian life.
At the same time, an equal number of soldiers from both sides,
numbering 50,000, would be assigned to the new army, the Forcas
Armada, Angolanas (FAA). Training for those selected for service
with the FAA would be the responsibility of Britain, France and
Portugal, under the overall supervision of the CCPM. UNAVEM
officials, operating in teams of two, were to be posted at each
of the Assembly Areas where FAPLA and FALA were to gather.
Notably, while some financial support targeting the demobilized
soldier's integration into civilian life had been mooted amongst
some elements of the international donor community, no concrete
provisions for its dispersement had been developed at this late
stage.
C. Implementation
The process established by UNAVEM for the investigation of
allegedly cease fire violations proved to be inadequate.
Compounding problems was the slow deployment of UNAVEM observers,
caused both by delays in New York and difficulties created by the
two parties, which meant that the verification of demobilisation
and disarmament was not fully operational until 3 0 September
1991. All in all, there were sixteen incidents which, according
the UNAVEM officials, in themselves could have resulted in a
renewal of significant conflict.20 Nonetheless, open hostilities
were by and large suspended during the build up to the elections
in late September 1992.
The neutrality of the national police force was a source of major
dissent between the government and Unita. The creation of the
Rapid Intervention Police, popularly known as the "Ninjas",
invoked severe criticism from Unita officials as they were
outside of the established demilitarisation programme. Trained
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by the notorious Spanish Guarda Civil, the Rapid Intervention
Police were composed of several military units drawn from the
army and the security forces and numbered approximately 4,000.
The actual demobilization of Angolan soldiers was a dismal
failure. Conditions in the Assembly Areas were appalling,
lacking all the pre-requisites for such an operation such as
proper shelter, food and water. Rioting Government soldiers,
protesting the absence of basic necessities in the Assembly Areas
and the overall slowness of the demobilization process,
threatened to demobilize "spontaneously". The unwillingness of
the Government to provide the requisite transportation and
foodstuffs for the assembled troops proved to be a major
stumbling block in the demobilization process. Efforts by UNAVEM
military observers to develop an accurate count of the number of
demobilized soldiers were hampered to the extreme by the shortage
of UN personnel. Insufficient controls for monitoring the
movement of troops, causing UNAVEM military observers to resort
to weekly estimates of encamped troops, rendered UN monitoring
irrelevant.
In contrast to FAPLA, Unita forces remained largely disciplined
and under central control. However, the leadership proved to be
generally unwilling to engage its troops in the demobilization
process. Unita cited the lack of preparation on the part of the
international community for the integration of its troops into
civilian life as a reason for withholding from the process.21
The difficulties of gaining access to Unita-controlled territory
further impeded UNAVEM in its efforts to keep abreast of the
situation in the field.
Despite these shortcomings, by May 1992 70 per cent of the
160,000 soldiers were in the Assembly Areas but of these, only
6,000 had actually been demobilized.22 By June the figure had
increased to 20,000, with 85% of Unita troops in place and 37%
of Government forces in the Assembly Areas. By 7 October (a week
after the election) UNAVEM officials claimed that 96,620 FAPLA
troops had been demobilised.23
Accusations and counter accusations of violation of the
demobilization process increased as the deadline for disarming
Angolan troops neared. As noted above, Unita claimed that the
Government converted several military units into paramilitary
units and placed them under the control of the national police.
At the same time, the Government reported that Unita was
illegally holding 20,000 troops in reserve in Cuango Cubango
province. A UNAVEM investigation team subsequently verified
that several hundred unaccounted FALA troops were in fact in that
area but, due to the lack of UN personnel, were unable to bring
them into the demobilization process.24
Linked to the problems of demobilization were obstacles hampering
the establishment of the new national military. These included
lack of facilities (adequate or otherwise) for soldiers,
apparently a result of both the illegal sale of government
material by the military and the re-allocation of resources to
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training and equipping the Rapid Intervention Police.25 Despite
the failure to move forward on establishing a new national army,
in order to maintain the facade of adherence to the Bicesse
Accords, the Government and Unita held an official ceremony on
27 September inaugurating the FAA.25 As late as October, only
two of the sixteen were rehabilitated for use and 8,800 soldiers
had been integrated into the new national army.
Against this increasingly somber background, over 90% of the
eligible Angolans voted in the election, with dos Santos winning
49.6% to Savimbi's 40% in the presidential race, while the MPLA
secured 54% to Unita's 34% for seats in the legislature. Short
of the requisite 50% for the presidency, the two leaders were
obliged to conduct a run off election; this was never to
happened. Savimbi, claiming fraud, remobilized his troops and
began a military campaign to consolidate UNITA positions in early
October. Within a few weeks, Luanda itself was gripped by
fighting as the government launched a counter strike against
Unita. Persistent efforts by UN officials to broker a cease fire
between the two warring Angolan factions came to naught and, by
the end of January 1993, the Secretary General observed that a
state of civil war existed in Angola. The continued violations
of truces forced the downsizing of UNAVEM II and with resignation
of the Special Representative in May 1993.
Mozambique and ONUMOZ
The demilitarisation programme in Mozambique, in contrast to the
Namibian and Angolan examples, adopted an approach which
deliberately sought to link short term objectives with long term
goals. Utilizing the international NGO community to a greater
extent than in previous operations, and cognizant of the recent
debacle in Angola, the UN mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ) put
together a coordinated effort which rivalled UNTAG in size but
far exceeded it in breadth.
A. The Peace Agreement and Demilitarisation
The General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed by the Government of
Mozambique and Renamo in October 1992 called specifically for UN
participation in the areas of the monitoring of the cease fire,
providing humanitarian assistance and monitoring of the
elections. The SRSG, Aldo Ajello, in cooperation with the
Western powers which had been party to the negotiations in Rome,
convinced the Government and Renamo to formally establish the
Supervising and Monitoring Commission (CSC) as the central
authority overseeing the implementation of the GPA. The CSC's
mandate included the settling of disputes between the parties,
any question of interpretation of the GPA and a coordinating role
for the subsidiary commissions to be established. The Cease Fire
Commission, the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilizing
Military Personnel and the Joint Commission for the Formation of
the Mozambican Defence Force were created to managed specific
aspects of demilitarization.
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The time table set by the parties to the GPA was as follows:
* the cease fire to commence 15 October 1993;
* demobilisation to be completed by 1 April 1993
and the subsequent formation of a new national
army;
* and elections to be held in October 1993.27
B. ONUMOZ and Demilitarization
The demilitarization programme employed by ONUMOZ sought to
integrate the international community's efforts in supporting
short and long term demilitarization. Short term components
included the monitoring of the cease fire and the supervision of
the demobilization of combatants. Long term components focused
on projects which targeted ex-combatants, including provisions
for a two year subsidy, job referal and training programmes.
Underlying the UN's demilitarization plan was the desire to
separate the demobilization process from that of the electoral
process.28 And, in contrast to UNAVEM II, sufficient financial
and human resources were made available to fulfil these
ambitions.
Monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique, a
condition Renamo had insisted upon at Rome, was the first task
of the UN demilitarization programme in Mozambique. It was
decided to bring 7,500 UN peacekeeping troops into the country
to monitor their departure and take up positions along the
transport corridors. The Cease Fire Commission (CCF), composed
of the Mozambican parties, representatives of the international
community and members of ONUMOZ, worked to ensure that peace was
maintained in the rest of the territory. The terms of the
Commission were specific: it was to investigate allegations
brought to it of violations of the cease fire agreement signed
in Rome.
The demobilization of combatants formed the second part of
ONUMOZ's involvement in demilitarization. A specialized unit
attached to the mission planned and implemented demobilization.
A team of four UN personnel were assigned to each of the 4 9
Assembly Areas where they were to oversee the process, including
the registration of combatants, disarmament, the selection of
soldiers for the new army and formal demobilization. Education,
entertainment and general logistical arrangements were also their
responsibility.
The last short term component of demilitarization was the
creation of a new national army. It was initially envisaged that
the new army would consist of 30,000 soldiers, equally divided
between former Government and former Renamo troops and trained
by the British, French and Portuguese.29 The Joint Commission
for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force was to be the
point of intersection between the Mozambican parties and key
members of the international donor community.
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The long term component of demilitarization, namely the
Information Referral Service (IRS) and the Reintegration Support
Scheme (RSS), fell under the auspices of the United Nations
Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC). These
latter measures were to be integrated into the actions taken by
the Commission for Reintegration (CORE), the institution
established by the Rome Agreement to direct the process of re-
integrating soldiers and refugees into civilian life. The IRS
was conceived as a mechanism for providing demobilized soldiers
with access to information on the job market as well as basic
information on aspects of the reintegration programme.
Originally falling under the auspices of CORE (which proved to
be ineffective) , its eleven provincial offices were actually run
by IOM.30 Using a Trust Fund administered by the UNDP, the RSS
was to provide demobilized soldiers with eighteen months of
subsidies in the form of caish disbursements given at local
branches of the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento.31 By providing
a reasonable assurance of financial support for an extended
period of time, it was hoped that the former combatants would
find employment in their districts and, concurrently, integrate
into the local community. To assist in this process, vocational
kits consisting of agricultural tools, seeds, and food rations
for up to three months were given to de-mobilized soldiers upon
departure from the Assembly Areas. UNOHAC used a host of
development and refugee support agencies to implement these
programmes. For example, in the area of de-militarization,
UNOHAC contracted out to the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) to organize transportation of demobilized
soldiers while for long term assistance, UNOHAC turned to the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) who, in partnership
with the Ministry of Finance and IOM, put into play the RSS.
Finally, the monitoring of conduct of the election campaign was
the responsibility of the UN's Civpol. Numbering 128 (later
expanded to 1,114), Civpol wais attached to Mozambican police
units to assure that the electoral process was conducted in an
atmosphere free of intimidation and, concurrently, that human
rights of citizens were respected.
32C. Implementation
With a six month delay in bringing the mission up to full
strength in Mozambique, a new time table had to be set which
called for the concentration of troops in the Assembly Areas to
begin in September 1993 with full de-mobilization completed in
May 1994; the new army to be operational by September 1994; and
the election to take place in October 1994.
The initial step in implementing the demilitarization programme
was to bring in the UN peace; keeping forces to monitor the
withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops. Despite delays
that held up their introduction until August 1993, a total of
6,000 peacekeepers were finally put into place. Concurrent with
the introduction of UN troops was the monitoring of the cease
fire between the Government and Renamo by the CCF. As the
majority of violations involved unauthorized troop movements
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rather than shooting incidents, the task of monitoring was
confined to assessing claims of position and territory.33 In the
interim, the GPA mandated separation of forces was abandoned as
adherence to it would have delayed the peace process further.
The next phase of demilitarization, the demobilization of
Government and Renamo troops, proved to be exceedingly
problematic. In an especially ambiguous passage, the GPA had
allowed for "dual administration" of territory controlled by the
Government and Renamo (which was to be reconciled before the
elections through a joint commission on territorial
administration), thus giving way to conflicts over everything
from internal movement to taxation. In addition, the clash over
siting of Assembly Areas, which fell victim to strategic
manoeuvring the Government and Renamo, was only brought to a
close through a compromise brokered by the SRSG.34 As a result
it was not until November 1993 that twenty of the 49 Assembly
Areas were officially opened to receive troops while the rest did
not become operational until February 1994.3S The slow pace of
demobilization, a product of lengthy indecision and confrontation
by the Mozambican parties, fuelled dissent amongst combatants
housed within the Assembly Areas. Months of confinement in the
monotony of the camps gave way to demonstrations and riots,
targeting both local military and UN officials.36
With pressure to commence the demobilization from both the
international donor community and the soldiers themselves,
spurred in part by the approach of newly established deadlines
for the mission, ONUMOZ decided that the first demobilizations
should take place mid March 1994. The assembly phase was
completed on 15 August, in spite of uneven cooperation from the
Government and Renamo, with the final total of registered
soldiers being over 86,000.37 Nevertheless, approximately 5,000
Government troops and 2,000 Renamo troops remained outside of the
official demobilization process.38
The establishment of the Forcas Armadas de Defensa de Mocambique
(FADM) was another contentious aspect of the demilitarization
programme. Training of trainers was slow to start, while joint
command of the new army was only agreed upon in January 1994 and
80 officers were appointed in June to command the newly created
infantry battalions. Delays in the supply of new equipment and
the renovation of inadequate training facilities, coupled with
the prolonged process of identifying new soldiers forced the
compression of training into six weeks. Unhappiness over the
prospect of being forced to continue in the military brought
about strikes and desertions.39 By election time in October
1994, less than 10,000 soldiers had completed their training and
Mozambican officials were lowering the target size for the FADM
to 15,000 at arms.
The long term component of demilitarization, introducing measures
for the long term maintenance of the demobilized troops, was
taken up by UNOHAC's IRS and its RSS. With the able assistance
of IOM (which played the principal role in reintegration as CORE
failed to materialize), the transportation of demobilized
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soldiers and their dependents to their chosen destinations
occurred with minimum problems. The subsidy scheme commenced
without significant hitches while the IRS offices received
numerous enquiries and assisted in job placement.
The elections of October 1994 were marred by one last crisis.
The Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, pulled his party out hours
before the polling was to begin; however, concerted pressure on
the part of the Western powers and the SADC leadership caused him
to reverse his decision. The result was a turnout of over 85%
and the election of the Government's candidate, Joaquim Chissano,
to the presidency by a margin of 53% while Dhlakama received 33%.
In the legislative elections, the Government party, Frelimo, won
129 seats to Renamo's 112, with the rest of the seats going to
smaller parties. Declaring the mission a resounding success,
ONUMOZ withdrew from Mozambique by late December.
III. The Future of Demilitarization and UN Peace Building
If the Southern African cases cited here are to serve as any
guide, it is principally to suggest that the issue of the
military and the UN's role in the demilitarization process
deserves renewed consideration on a number of levels.
First, demilitarization knows no boundaries. To cite but a few
examples, some of the demobilized soldiers from Koevoet were to
re-appear as Unita soldiers after the collapse of the Angola
peace agreement. In Mozambique, official disarmament proved to
be hopelessly inadequate, with a further 22,000 arms unearthed
from amongst 14 6 undeclared weapons caches, and many arms finding
their way into neighbouring South Africa and Zimbabwe.40 The
successful transformation of the regional heritage of conflict,
especially those issues of a military nature, requires an
atmosphere of active and institutionalized cooperation between
the states of Southern Africa. An approach which is predicated
upon an understanding of economic assymetry and porous borders
in the region would in all likelihood stand a better chance of
minimizing post-conflict problems than one which treats each
conflict as a discrete, state-based situation. To cite two
examples, programmes which seek to coordinate the disarmament
phase of demilitarization in one area with an increase in cross-
border surveillance would, hopefully, act to stem the traffic in
small arms; equally, it is reasonable to assume that economies
of scale could be achieve in developing a regional approach to
the costly task of demining. The preliminary structures emerging
out of the SADC framework are a significant step towards
providing a forum for devising regional strategies to the address
post-conflict management issues.41 In this regard, it is
possible in future settings for the international community and
in particular the UN system, through the initiation of a short
and long term demilitarization programme integrated across state
boundaries, to make a Stronger commitment to the promotion of an
enabling environment for tackling the post-conflict problems of
demilitarization on a regional basis.
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Second, implementation of demilitarization programmes requires
not only conceptual clarity as to the emergency/development
continuum but ongoing coordination between the UN, the
international donor and NGO community. Clarity between emergency
and development is, with a few exceptions, well understood in
terms of actual conceptualization of demilitarisation programmes;
this can be readily seen in the sophisticated approach to
demilitarisation applied during the ONUMOZ mission. However,
translating that into a coordinated approach that effectively
pools the resources of the relevant UN and non-UN agencies as
well as the host government and donors, is still proving to be
problematic. In fact, while' the three case studies cited here
seem to present a picture of deepening cooperation and
coordination both within the UN system and the NGO community,
events in Angola indicate a disturbing trend away from that
approach. UCAH, the local coordinating body established by the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Luanda, maintains its
distance from UNAVEM III while the NGOs are at pains to ensure
their independence of action from UCAH.42 Enduring institutional
biases which range from considerations of mandate to more prosaic
matters keep the international community from acting effectively
in collaborating together in demilitarisation. Furthermore, the
perchance for UN and NGOs to introduce elements into
demilitarisation programmes which can only be construed as self-
serving (e.g., promoting the inclusion of a component into the
demilitarization programme whose sole virtue is that it matches
the institution's selected expertise), endangers what is already
a volatile situation.
And third, further analysis of the long term component of
demilitarisation needs to be undertaken. Studies by the World
Bank and private consultancy firms do not as yet provide
sufficient evidence to state unequivocally that the utilization
of a targeted approach to reintegration is the most efficatious
policy.43 These preliminary findings, especially as they rely
heavily on case studies whose reintegration programmes are very
much in progress, should be treated with caution. The selection
of target groups, which spill over into the post-conflict
development process, can act to re-affirm the ex-combatants
identity and give him a sense of entitlement and expectations
that is beyond the means of the post-conflict state. At its most
egregious, the Namibian government's belated formulation of
Development Brigades, with their severe cost implications and
attendant social problems, is a marked failure of targeting.44
At the same time, it is readily understood that for many
soldiers, resort to arms -- whether in the form of military
service or banditry -- is the only real means of "employment"
available to them. A programme which actively responds to the
immediate financial and employment deficencies of former
combatants while recognizing the longer term imperative of social
integration would be ideal. An earlier version of Mozambique's
Reintegration Support Scheme, which provided incremental
financial assistance over a set time period and linked such
support, effectively, to a fixed domicile, was one effort to
couple targeting concerns with the promotion of integration into
the local community.45 Still, given the centrality of
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demilitarisation to the peace process and its sustainability, it
behooves the international community to develop a better
understanding of this process.
With the future of multi-dimensional peace support operations of
the kind cited in this paper in question, perhaps it is important
to re-affirm a central point about the UN and demilitarisation.
Succintly put, should UN peace support operations be involved in
the long term component of demilitarization? The answer is a
qualified yes. The overlap between short and long term
components of demilitarisation, whether it is in the area of the
linkage of the demobilisation process to reintegration measures
or developing local capacity to manage long term reintegration
projects, necessitates integrated planning at the earliest
possible moment in the demilitarisation process. And, it is
logical to assume that a coordinating authority such as the UN
would serve as an integral part of that process. However, with
its uneven record in Southern Africa and elsewhere, the logic of
the centrality of UN involvement is less appealing. For
demilitarisation to succeed against all odds, and the post-
conflict state is rife with crippling problems, it needs a better
UN than the one we have today.,
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